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1. Religious traditions and the challenge of the secular principle.
One of  the  most  complex  challenges of  our  modern  constitutional  democracies
concerns the relationship between cultural and legal traditions and the moral and political
duty  to  be  “secular”.  The  secular,  indeed,  “has  become a  central  modern  category  -
theologico-philosophical, legal-political, and cultural-anthropological - to construct, codify,
grasp, and experience a realm or reality differentiated from ‘the religious’”1. As Charles
Taylor pointed out, “it is generally agreed that modern democracies have to be ‘secular’.
There is perhaps a problem, a certain ethnocentricity, involved in this term. But even in the
Western context the term is not limpid and may in fact be misleading. What in fact does it
mean?”2.  According to  Taylor,  a secular  regime involves a certain separation between
state  and  church,  but  also  “more  than  this”;  especially  in  our  pluralistic  postmodern
societies, the secular principle “requires that there be some kind of neutrality, or ‘principled
distance’, to use Rajeev Bhargava’s term”3. But, again, “neutrality” or “principled distance”
are very blurred terms, and there is not a strong consensus on what they really mean.
As is well-known, the separation between state and church or between politics and
religions  is  not  a  novel  issue,  and  “the  interaction  between  the  state  and  religious
institutions goes back to the emergence of the state as a distinct legal or constitutional
construct”4. For that reason (and many others), the issues concerning the secular principle
have evolved in Western democracies in different forms and legal models, strictly related
to the historical, economic, social, religious and moral developments of every country and
society. We do not want here to explore the legal, cultural, and historical differences in the
 This is the paper presented by the authors at the European Academy of Religion 2017 - Ex Nihilo
Zero Conference  (Bologna,  June 21,  2017),  within the  Seminar  “Law,  Religion,  and Tradition:  Dismissal  or
Recovery?”. Albeit the unitary conception of the manuscript, Luca Pietro Vanoni drafted Sections 1 and 2;
Giada Ragone drafted Section 3 (including the paragraphs 3.1, 3.2, 3.3). Sections 4 was drafted together. 
1 J. Casanova, The Secular and Secularisms, 76 Social Research 4, 2009, p. 1049.
2 See C. Taylor, The meaning of Secularism, The Hedgehog Review 12:3, 2010, p. 23.
3 Ibidem.
4 F. Venter, Constitutionalism and Religion, Edwar Elgar Publishing, 2015, p. 9.  
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meaning of the secular principle in Western countries5. Nonetheless, we can explicate two
general and very broad approaches to the term “secular” that are useful to explain the
tricky relationship between religious tradition and secular law in our modern (and post-
secular) age. 
Some  think  that  the  term  “secular”  implies  a  strong  impenetrable  separation
between politics and religion, and an absolute strict neutrality of the public space (this is
the secularist position). The core of this theory is that religion must be confined to the
private sphere because it “is either an irrational force or a non-rational form of discourse
that should be banished from the democratic public sphere”6. This conception of religion
arose from the historical clash between the absolute states of the 16th century and the rise
of the Enlightenment’s political thought, and from the idea that the traditional role of the
religion in shaping the cultural tradition of the European societies was “a leftover of the
past defeated by the Reason of the West” and “an ancient idea that has to be relegated in
the pre-legal, if not in the personal conscience”7. Starting from this secularist approach,
secularization  produces  the  following  paradox:  “in  the  name  of  freedom,  individual
autonomy,  tolerance,  and  cultural  pluralism,  religious  people  -  Christian,  Jewish,  and
Muslims - are being asked to keep their religious belief, identities, and norms ‘private’ so
they do not disturb the project of modern, secular, enlightened Europe”8. 
This idea of secularism has a strong and oppositive impact on cultural heritage and
traditions, as clearly shown several years ago by the European battle for the inclusions of
a  reference  to  Europe’s  Judeo-Christian  roots  in  the  European  Constitution9.  In  sum,
especially  in  Europe,  “any public  recognition  of  the  Christian  heritage  or  of  the  living
religious traditions of contemporary Europeans would make liberal  political  coexistence
5 See C. Taylor, The Polysemy of the Secular, 76 Social Research 4, 2009, p. 1147: “the history of this term
‘secular’ in the West is complex and ambiguous. It starts off as a term in a dyad, which distinguishes two
dimensions of existence, identifying them by the kind of time essential to each. But then building on the clear
immanent/transcendent distinction, it mutates into a term in another dyad, where ‘secular’ refers to what
pertains to a self-sufficient immanent sphere, and its contrasting term (often identified as ‘religious’) relates
to the transcendent realm. This can then undergo a further mutation, via a denial of this transcendent level,
into a dyad in which one term refers to the real (the secular), and the other to what is merely invented (the
religious); or where ‘secular’ refers to the institutions we really require to live in ‘this world,’ and ‘religious’
or ‘ecclesial’ to optional extras that often disturb the course of this-worldly life”.
6 J. Casanova, The Secular and Secularisms, 76 Social Research 4, 2009, p. 1052.
7 G. Zagrebelsky, Scambiarsi la veste, LaTerza, 2018, p. 18.
8 J.  Casanova,  Religion,  European  Secular  Identities,  and  European  Integration,  in  T.  Birnes  and  P.
Katzenstein (eds), Religion in Expanding Europe, Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 66-67.
9 See J. H. H. Weiler, Un’Europa Cristiana – Un saggio esplorativo, BUR, 2003.
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and pluralist  toleration in a united Europe nearly impossible” because some “dominant
discourse in Europe prefers to hold on to the idea of single secular modernity, emerging
out of the Enlightenment”10.
The secularist approach of the privatization of religion was used for several years to
explain modernity. But it is probably not useful anymore to understand the very complexity
of our postmodern (and post-secular) societies. As Peter Berger pointed out, “the theory
that modernity brings about a decline of religion (...) has to be discarded” for two main
reasons. First “most of the sociologists of religion now agree that this theory has been
empirically shown to be false”. Second, the theory “fails spectacularly in explaining the
difference between the United States and the Europe”11. The first reason is strictly related
to the so called Revanche de Dieu12, and with the phenomenon of the “deprivatization” of
religions; as clearly shown by the studies of Josè Casanova, religious traditions of all the
world  are  refusing  to  accept  the  marginal  and  privatized  role  that  some  theories  of
secularization have reserved to them13. The second reason provides a new perspective in
the inquiry of the proper meaning of the secular principle, that, according to Peter Berger,
needs to  be investigated in  the light  of  US secularization.  The United States,  indeed,
embraces a particular  conception of the secular  state that,  at  the same time,  strongly
recognizes the religious and transcendental  heritages of  the nation (expressed by the
famous motto “a Nation under God”) and a concrete “wall of separation between church
and state”, established by the First Amendment of the Constitution. In this light, the First
Amendment  paradoxically  served  to  reinforce  a  strong  link  between  religion  and  the
nation;  as Dwight  D.  Eisenhower  said:  “Our Government makes no sense unless it  is
founded on a deeply held religious belief – and I don’t care what it is!”14. 
This second approach to the secular principle is perhaps useful to reconcile the
clash between tradition and modernity in the secularization process. This is particularly
important from a political point of view because, as Charles Taylor pointed out, “for people
to act together, to deliberate in order to form a common will on which they will act, requires
10 J. Casanova, Religion, European Secular Identities, and European Integration, in T. Birnes and P. 
Katzenstein (eds), Religion in Expanding Europe, Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 66.
11 P. Berger  G. Davie,E. Fokas,  Religious America, Secular Europe? A theme and Variation , Ashgate,
2008, p. 10.
12 Title of a famous book of G. Kepel, La Revanche de Dieu, Paris, 1991.
13 J. Casanova, Oltre la secolarizzazione: le religioni alla riconquista della sfera pubblica , il Mulino, 2000,
passim.
14 Cfr. P. Berger, G. Davie and E. Fokas, supra note 14, p. 42-43.
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a high degree of common commitment, a sense of common identification. A society of this
kind presupposes trust, the basic trust that members and constituent groups have to have,
the confidence that they are really part of the process, that they will be listened to and their
views taken account of by the others. Without this mutual commitment, this trust will be
fatally eroded”15. 
But reconciling tradition with modernity is also important from a constitutional point
of view: as Mary Ann Glendon pointed out, “after all rights emerge from cultures; rights
cannot  be  sustained  without  cultural  underpinnings;  and  rights,  to  be  effective,  must
become part of each people’s way of life”16. Starting from this perspective, according to
Andrea Pin, “national religious and cultural traditions have recently come to play a new
role in shaping the contemporary identity of the states: they have been considered in their
connections with modern human rights, rather than as opposed to them”17.
2. Strict Neutrality vs. Historical Argument.
One of the fields where the clash between the ambition toward secularism and the
need to  enhance cultural  traditions  mostly  emerges is  the debate  on the  presence of
religions in the public space. Courts and judges are often asked to solve conflicts involving
religious claims, trying to maintain simultaneously respect for religious identities, religious
freedom and the principle of equality of every belief before the state. The difficulty of this
task arises clearly within  the extensive  case law on religious symbols and ceremonial
prayers, both in Europe and in the USA18. This is one of the biggest challenges that the
constitutional courts have to address in our days: as Justice Rehnquist pointed out, all
Establishment Clause challenges “present us with the difficulty of respecting both faces.
Our  institutions  presuppose  a  Supreme  Being,  yet  these  institutions  must  not  press
religious observances upon their citizens. One face looks to the past in acknowledgment of
our Nation’s  heritage,  while  the other looks to  the present  in demanding a separation
between church and state. Reconciling these two faces requires that we neither abdicate
15  C. Taylor, note 2, p. 30.
16 M.A. Glendon, Justice and Human Rights: Reflections on the Address of Pope Benedict to the UN, (2008)
19 European Journal of International Law 926.
17 A. Pin, Religions, National Identities, and the Universality of Human Rights, in 3 Oxford Journal of
Law and Religion 3, 2014, p. 432. 
18 For an analysis of ECHR and US jurisprudence in cases concerning religious symbols,  see D.
Tega, Imperfect Symmetry. The Court of Strasbourg and the US Supreme Court on religious symbols in public spaces ,
EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2016/08; Z. R. Calo,  Constructing the Secular: Law and Religion Jurisprudence in
Europe and United States, in EUI working paper, RSCAS 2014/94, 2014.
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our responsibility to maintain a division between church and state nor evince a hostility to
religion  by  disabling  the  government  from  in  some  ways  recognizing  our  religious
heritage”19.
In order to address this challenge, constitutional judges often try to extract from a
certain definition of “secular state” a particular legal standard and use it as the legal tool
useful to reconcile, once for all, all the cases concerning religions in public spaces. The
most-used legal standard is the so-called principle of “strict neutrality”, which finds varied
implementations.  There  are  of  course  different  conceptions  of  “neutrality”  not  only  in
different jurisdictions, but sometimes even within the same court’s case law20. Anyway, the
core of this legal  standard comes from the Rawls’  definition of neutrality:  “as practical
political matter no general moral conception can provide a public recognized basis for a
conception  of  justice  in  modern  democratic  state”21.  Starting  from  this  perspective,
neutrality as a legal standard implies two main goals: strict and strong separation between
state and church; and freedom from religion (instead of freedom of religions). 
This  idea  of  neutrality  has  received  many criticisms from a  theoretical  point  of
view22.  As  some  political  thinkers  pointed  out,  neutrality  is  “incoherent  because  any
determinate politics must necessarily rely upon and promote some contestable scheme of
values”23. From a constitutional point of view, the judicial use of strict neutrality as a legal
standard addresses the clash between secularism and cultural traditions by dismissing the
latter from public life. But, as Justice O’Connor pointed out, this produces a paradoxical
effect: “certain ceremonial references to God and religion in our Nation are the inevitable
19 See Van Orden v. Perry 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (Chief Justice Rehnquist concurring opinion).
20 As clearly shown by M. Movsesian,  State-Sponsored Religious Display in th US and Europe, in S.
Ferrari and R. Cristofori, III Religion in Public Spaces, Burlington, 2013, p. 510 ss.
21 J. Rawl, Justice and Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, in Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1985, p. 205.
The philosophical idea of neutrality is one of the most studied principles of our time. See (for example) J.
Rawls,  A Theory of  Justice,  Cambridge, Press of Harvard University, 1971; R. Nozick,  Anarchy, State,  and
Utopia,  New York:  Basic  Books,  1974;  B.  Ackerman,  Social  Justice  in  the  Liberal  State,  New  Haven:  Yale
University Press,  1980, R. Dworkin,  “Liberalism”, in A Matter of Principle, Cambridge, Harvard University
Press, 1985.; C.E. Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity, Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1987.
22 The  incoherence  of  neutrality  was  raised  also  from  a  constitutional  point  of  view.  See  A.
Koppelman,  The  Fluidity  of  Neutrality,  66  The  Review  of  Politics  4,  2004,  p.  635-636:  “The  charge  of
incoherence was raised against the idea of neutrality in the Supreme Court’s religion jurisprudence.  This
objection focused on a deep tension in the Court’s position, between the idea that religious conscientious
objectors ought to be accommodated and the idea that government should be neutral between religion and
nonreligion.” See also F.S.. Ravitch,  Master of Illusion.The Supreme Court and the religious clauses, New York
University Press, 2007.
23  See, e.g., William A. Galston,  Liberal Purposes: Goods,  Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State,
Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 92-94.
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consequence of the religious history that gave birth to our founding principles of liberty. It
would  be  ironic  if  this  Court  were  to  wield  our  constitutional  commitment  to  religious
freedom so as to sever our ties to the traditions developed to honor it”24.
These criticisms cannot be leveled against a second legal standard used by judges:
the so-called “historical argument”.  It  comes from a different conception of the secular
state, and it is raised up in opposition to a strong idea of assertive secularism and strict
neutrality.  According  to  this  argument,  judges must  take into  account  the  cultural  and
religious traditions of their systems as far as they are strongly rooted in the institutional (or
even constitutional) history of their Nations. This kind of argument has been widely used in
the Western word and especially by the Supreme Court of the United States in order to
admit the constitutionality of the so-called “American ceremonial deism” or the use of the
words “under God” or “in God we trust” in the American public and institutional life 25.  In
sum, the historical argument  can be described as a wide umbrella under which cultural
traditions – as religious ceremonies and habits – can find protection when they are eligible
to be considered historical customs deeply rooted in the societies. 
The historical argument has the merit of reconciling the secular state with its cultural
heritage.  Nonetheless,  the  use  of  the  historical  argument  alone  is  both  weak  and
formalistic:  first,  practical  jurists  cannot  solve hard conflicts  just  resorting to  “what  has
always  been  done”26.   Second,  it  has  the  following  -  paradoxical  -  effect:  a  religious
tradition can find a place into the public space only if its meaning is no longer “religious”
but strictly “secular”. This opens up the Pandora’s box of the interpretation of symbols and
traditions:  when  can  a  crucifix  or  a  tablet  of  the  Ten  Commandments  or  a  religious
invocation  can  be  described  as  “secular”  or  as  “religious”?  How many  years  must  a
24 See Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (Justice O’ Connor concurring 
opinion) 
25 This argument was strongly used by the Chief Justice William Rehnquist in order to declare the
compatibility of some American traditions (such as the phrase “under God” of the Pledge of Allegiance)
with the Establishment  Clause.  As pointed out  by B.   Ledewitz,  Church, State,  and the  crisis of  American
Secularism, Indiana University Press, 2011, p. 33, “Chief Justice Rehnquist relied primarily on the presence in
American history ‘of patriotic invocations of God and official acknowledgments of religion’s role in our
Nation’s history’. From numerous examples, such as the national motto ‘in God We Trust’ and opening of
the United States Supreme Court sessions with the language ‘God Save the United States and this honorable
Court’,  Chief  Justice  Rehnquist  concluded  that  ‘our  national  culture  allows  public  recognition  of  our
Nations’s religious history and character’”. This argument was mostly used by conservative Justices of the
Supreme Court.
26 From this point of view, the historical argument presents some similarities with the theory of
original intent developed by Justice A. Scalia.
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religious symbol stay in the public space in order to be considered part of the national
historical tradition?27 
As we have attempted to explain, the two legal standards mostly used by courts are
not convincing enough. Our aim is to point to a third way to realize the ambition toward a
secular state, on the one hand, and to enhance religious traditions according to their true
meanings, on the other. This third solution is based on three main premises: a) the idea of
finding a unique abstract legal standard, capable of resolving every case, is a utopia; b)
the  place of  religion  in  the  public  space  does  not  involve  a  binary  relation  (state  vs.
church),  but  rather  it  is  a  complex  triangular  relational  principle  (that  involves  State,
Religion, and Civil Society); c) the main aim of the courts tasked to decide on  conflicts
involving religious claims should be that of protecting individuals from concrete harm of
their religious (and nonreligious) rights: the goal of the courts is not to enforce a certain
idea of the secular state or laicité, but to ensure pluralism and religious peace. Let us see
within the Italian case law whether and when this third approach – which considers laicità
a tool, not a goal - has succeeded.
3. The Italian case Law 
Because of its peculiar political and diplomatic relationship with the Catholic Church
(and the presence – within its borders – of the Vatican State), Italy has an odd church-
state relationship. As is well-known, Catholic traditions are deeply rooted in this country,
even at the core of the constitutional system. The first evidence of this is that, according to
Article 7 of the Constitution28, the relations between the State and the Catholic Church are
regulated by the Lateran pacts, whose amendments are admitted only when accepted by
both parties. In case of amendments not accepted by the Catholic Church, the State must
27 That  explain,  for  examples,  the  controversial  decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court  on  the  Ten
Commandments in  Van Orden v. Perry 545 US 677 (2005) and  McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties
Union of Ky. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).  See L.P. Vanoni,  Pluralismo religioso e stato (post) secolare.  Una sfida per la
modernità, Giappichelli, 2016.
28 See Article 7 of the Italian Constitution: “The State and the Catholic Church are independent and
sovereign, each within its own sphere. Their relations are regulated by the Lateran pacts. Amendments to
such  Pacts  which  are  accepted  by  both  parties  shall  not  require  the  procedure  of  constitutional
amendments”. 
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resort  to  the  more  protective  procedure  of  constitutional  amendment.  Differently29,  the
relations between the State and the other religions are regulated by the ordinary law30.
As pointed out by Andrea Pin31, the Catholic roots of Italian constitutional culture are
also mirrored in our constitutional jurisprudence.  Since the Constitution does not contain
any sort of “establishment clause”, it was the Constitutional Court that shaped a brand-new
idea of laicità (the word classically used to indicate the non-establishment principle and the
separation between church and state in Italy). The laicità principle was, indeed, explicitly
introduced by the Constitutional Court’s decision n. 203/1989. And, according to Pin 32, it
had minimal association with the hostile French separation of church and state (laicitè). 
It is not by chance that the abovementioned constitutional  judgment regarded the
constitutional compatibility of teaching the Catholic religion in public schools. Indeed, as it
happens in many other countries of the Western world, also in Italy, the first places where
secularism and cultural  heritage clash are  these institutions.  And some of the trickiest
cases decided afterwards by the Italian courts at the light of the  laicità principle again
involved the presence of the religions in the public schools. Everyone knows the political
and legal battle about the crucifix in Italian classrooms. And actually there is extensive
case  law  concerning  the  display  of  this  religious/cultural  symbol  in  Italy33.  The  most
debated of the cases, the  Lautsi case, is well-known all over the world as it has been
discussed two times before the European Court of Human Rights34. For sure, the case law
on the public display of crucifixes and other religious symbols in public schools35 is one of
29 See Article 8 of the Italian Constitution: “All religious denominations are equally free before the
law.  Denominations  other  than  Catholicism  have  the  right  to  self-organisation  according  to  their  own
statutes, provided these do not conflict with Italian law. Their relations with the State are regulated by law,
based on agreements with their respective representatives”.
30 For a detailed study on the Catholic roots within the Italian Constitution and the Framers’ debate,
see A. Pin, Public Schools, the Italian Crucifix, and the European Court of Human Rights: The Italian Separation of
Church and State, in Emory International Law Review, Vol. 25, No. 1, 95, 2011, p. 110 ff.
31 Id., p. 120.
32 Ibidem.
33 See L. P. Vanoni, Laicità e libertà di educazione. Il crocifisso nelle aule scolastiche in Italia e in Europa,
Giuffrè, 2013, p. 45 ff.
34 The first decision was delivered as a chamber judgment on November 3, 2009. After the Italian
government appeal, the second decision was released by the Grand Chamber on March 18, 2011.
35 On this topic, see - among the others - R.Bin, A. Brunelli, A. Pugiotto and P. Veronesi (eds.), La
laicità crocifissa? Il nodo costituzionale dei simboli religiosi nei luoghi pubblici , Giappichelli, 2004; J.H.H. Weiler,
Lautsi:  Crucifix  in  the  Classroom  Redux,  in  EJIL  https://www.ejiltalk.org/lautsi-crucifix-in-the-classroom-
redux/, 2010; J. Temperman (eds.),  The Lautsi Papers: Multidisciplinary Reflections on Religious Symbols in the
Public School Classroom, Brill, 2012; M.L. Movsesian, Crosses and Culture: State-Sponsored Religious Displays in
the US and Europe, in S. Ferrari and R. Cristofori,  III Religion in the Public Space, Burlington, 2013, p. 510 ff.;
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the best case studies to observe - in action - both the use of strict  neutrality and the
historical arguments by the Italian judges. Nonetheless, in this context, we want to also
bring attention to another - more recent - issue, which - as well - involves the space of the
religion in the public school, this time not through symbols but through religious ministers.
In  particular,  we  want  to  focus  on  a  case regarding  a  pastoral  visitation  in  a  school
community and  a  case  that  regards  the  Easter  Benediction  in  a  public  school.  The
decisions of the courts in these cases followed both the legal approaches explained above
(strict neutrality and historical arguments) but also - within the most recent judgment - a
third way.
In both these cases, the core legal questions raised by the appellants were: does
the presence of a religious minister in a public school violate the laicità principle? Does the
presence of a Catholic minister constitute discrimination based on religion for the pupils
who are not Catholic?
3.1. The Pastoral visitation and the use of the historical argument
The first  decision we want  to focus on, Council  of State (6 april  2010 n. 1911),
established that a pastoral  visitation in a public school does not have a discriminatory
effect36.  Indeed,  as  the  Council  clarified,  the  encounter  with  a  Bishop  could  not  be
considered a religious event: it must be seen as a “cultural testimony” of a religion (the
Catholic one), whose contents are worth knowing and studying. Therefore, the Bishop’s
visitation does not violate the laicità principle, and atheists or believers of other religions
cannot complain of discrimination. The Council’s decision articulates its legal judgment
using the historical argument: describing the pastoral visitation as “cultural testimony”, the
judges “secularized” a very ancient religious ritual of the Catholic Church and allowed its
presence in the public school only because it is a part of the cultural and historical tradition
in Italy. In order to do so, the administrative judges had to exclude from the judgment the
proper definition and meaning of the pastoral  visitation, that -  according to the Canon
Codex  -  does  constitute  a  religious  event37.  This  verdict  has  been  confirmed  by  the
F.M.  Gedicks  and  P.  Annichino,  Cross,  Crucifix,  Culture:  an  Approach  to  the  Constitutional  Meaning  of
Confessional Symbols, in Fir. Am. L. Rev., 2015, p. 102 ff.
36 According to the Italian legal framework (see D.lgs 416/1974, D.lgs 297/1994 and DPR 275/1999),
the autonomy of the educational institutions (protected by the Constitution at Article 117) permits them to
schedule cultural events inside the school, both during classes and outside of lesson time. 
37 See Canons n. 396-398 of the Codex iuris canonici.
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President of the Republic38 who, within an extraordinary appeal, rejected the complaints
saying that a pastoral visitation without a liturgical act (Eucharist, blessing, and so on) is
just a testimony of religious and cultural values. The argument used by the President and
by the Council of State in this occasion is not so far from the one used by the same Court
in the Lautsi  case in 200639. Here the administrative judges affirmed that the crucifix can
be displayed in public school as the cultural traditions rooted in this symbol enforce the
legal tradition of our Constitution. 
3.2. The Catholic Easter Benediction case: strict neutrality ...
The  second  case  we  want  to  focus  on  has  as  its  subject  the  Catholic  Easter
Benediction in a public school40. The main difference between this case and the previous
one is that, in this case, the presence of the minister in the school is irrefutably to perform
a religious ritual. Starting from this undisputed element, the administrative judges of first
instance and those of the appeal decided the case in two opposite ways.
The Administrative Court of Emilia Romagna (9th February 2016) stated that the
resolution of the school that allows the Easter Benediction - even if after classes and in the
presence of only the pupils whose parents decide to attend that event with their sons41 - is
unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional principle of  laicità. According to the
statement, a religious ritual (such as the Easter Benediction) cannot cross the walls of
public schools (even if scheduled as extracurricular events) and has to be confined into the
believers’  private  sphere.  The  administrative  judges  used  here  the  strict  neutrality
argument: i.e. the  laicità principle imposes a strict separation between church and state,
and religion must be excluded from public spaces and relegated into the private sphere. 
3.3. … and a third way approach.
38 See President Giorgio Napolitano’s decision delivered on May 6th 2011, available here: 
http://www.culturacattolica.it/cm-files/2011/12/15/7377.pdf .
39 See the decision n. 556 delivered by the Council of State on January 13th 2006.
40 About this case, see T. Di Iorio,  Oltre il muro dell’intolleranza. Luci e ombre della benedizione nella
scuola tra libertà religiosa e laicità dello Stato, in www.statoechiese.it, n. 24/2017; P. Cavana,  Libertà religiosa e
scuola pubblica. La piccola querelle delle benedizioni pasquali , in www.statoechiese.it, n. 2/2017; L. Muselli and
C.B. Ceffa, Libertà religiosa, obiezione di coscienza e giurisprudenza costituzionale, Giappichelli, 2017, p. 51 ff.
41 In  compliance  to  Article  311.2  of  D.lgs  297/1994  that  affirms:  "Per  dare  reale  efficacia
all'attuazione  del  diritto  di  avvalersi  o  di  non  avvalersi  di  insegnamenti  religiosi,  si  provvede  a  che
l'insegnamento  religioso ed ogni  eventuale  pratica  religiosa,  nelle  classi  in  cui  sono presenti  alunni  che
hanno dichiarato di non avvalersene, non abbiano luogo in occasione dell'insegnamento di altre materie, né
secondo orari che abbiano per i detti alunni effetti comunque discriminanti".
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That verdict was appealed to the Council of State (27 March 2017 n. 1388), which
came to an opposite result42. In this verdict, the Council does not deny that the benediction
is a religious ritual and it says that its celebration in a school permits the remembrance of
the presence of God in every place. Nonetheless, in this concrete case, the Court says
that the laicità principle was not violated. The judges affirm that, taking into consideration
the particular elements of the case, the benediction was not imposed on all the pupils, but
it was reserved for the ones who decided to attend it with their parents after classes. It
means that would be hard (if  not impossible) to find someone concretely discriminated
against or whose religious freedom was wounded because of the Benediction. It is worth
noting that the Council of State ignored the applicants’ claim that the Easter Benediction,
even if optional, is against the laicità principle because it shows an endorsement of a state
institution (the school) of one specific religion.  The Court’s silence on this point clarifies
that the goal  of  the Court  is not to enforce a certain idea of the secular state (where
religion cannot be professed in public), but to ensure pluralism and religious peace, taking
into consideration that the public space is not owned by the state but by the members of
the society. Finally, the judgment states that, according to an elementary principle of non-
discrimination,  the  religious nature  of  a  tradition  cannot  be,  itself,  the  only  reason for
forbidding  it.  There  should  be  other  concrete  evidence  that  the  habit  jeopardises  the
maintenance of pluralism and religious peace.
4. Conclusion
The approach followed by the Council of State in the Easter Benediction case takes
into account the three main goals we used to describe the “third way approach”. First, the
judges did not try to solve the case by resorting to an abstract legal standard, but they
started by analyzing it from a concrete point of view. Second, they considered the case
taking into account the civil  society as well,  and particularly the desire of a part of the
school community to receive the Easter Benediction. Third, the judges embraced a legal
approach that investigates the concrete real harm of the religious rights of the pupils in that
particular case: the Court does not affirm the general rule that a Catholic benediction in a
school  is always  in accordance with  the  laicità  principle;  it  says  that  a religious event
celebrated after classes and only in the presence of those who desire it is legitimate. In
42 Within the Italian administrative case law there is a similar precedent: Administrative Court of
Umbria, decision n. 677/2005. On this occasion, the Court declared the legitimacy of a Catholic Benediction
in a public school as it was optional and brief: therefore no one was concretely discriminated against, and the
pupils were not occupied for an excessive part of their free time.  
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conclusion, the third way approach does not provide an undisputable definition of laicità,
capable of resolving - once for all  -  all  the problems raised in the (post-) secular age.
Nonetheless  it  could  provide  the  courts  useful  tools  to  solve  -  case  by  case  -  those
conflicts raised in our multicultural society by the presence of religions in public spaces.
In the case of law and religion, the principle that should enlighten the decisions by
the courts is not a certain idea of neutrality or secularity, but the principles of pluralism and
religious tolerance. As these principles are very general goals, they cannot be achieved
through an abstract law. Rather they have to be pursued and lived within the concrete
circumstances of the ordinary life. 
This idea the indirectly echoes the considerations made by the ECHR in  Serif v.
Greece, 1999: “Although (...) it is possible that tension is created in situations where a
religious  or  any  other  community  becomes  divided,  this  is  one  of  the  unavoidable
consequences of pluralism”, and “the role of the authorities in such circumstances is not to
remove the cause of tension by eliminating pluralism, but to ensure that the competing
groups tolerate each other” (par. 53). 
In conclusion, in cases regarding the presence of religion into the public space, “careful
analysis of context is crucial. Different legal regimes, the products of different cultures and
histories”,  will  naturally adopt  different  responses and,  “even within  a single regime, a
variety  of  responses  may  be  appropriate,  depending  on  place,  speaker,  and  other
circumstances. In this area, as in so many others in law and religion, a rigid, categorical
approach seems unwise”43. As Taylor pointed out, “one of our basic difficulties in dealing
with these problems is that we have the wrong model, which has a continuing hold on our
minds. We think that secularism [or  laicità] has to do with the relation of the state and
religion, whereas in fact it has to do with the (correct) response of the democratic state to
diversity”44. 
**Luca Pietro Vanoni is Lecturer of Comparative Public Law at the University of Milan. 
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43 M. Movsesian, State-Sponsored Religious Displays in the U.S. and Europe: Introduction, in Faculty 
Publications. Paper 93, 2013, p. 6.
44 C. Taylor, supra note 2, p. 25.
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